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Casenote

Schoolhouse Rock: Lessons of Homosexual
Tolerance in Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley from

the Classroom to the Constitution

I.

INTRODUCTION

The public educational system is charged with more than the academic
success of America's youth. Educators are responsible for "nurtur[ing]
students' social and moral development by transmitting to them an
official dogma of community values."' As Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley'
demonstrates, community values are rapidly changing to acknowledge
new constructions of homosexual identity and constitutional interests
relative to historically marginalized attributes.3 In Keeton the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia denied a
1. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 278 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
2. 733 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (S.D. Ga. 2010).
3. Compare id. at 1381 (upholding college curriculum requiring counselors-in-training
to set aside religious reservations to acknowledge clients' homosexual life choices), with
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (refusing to protect an individual's right to
engage in same-sex sexual activity).
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preliminary injunction to a student asserting various First Amendment4
claims against her university for requiring her to complete remedial
training for counseling gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and
queer/questioning (GLBTQ) clients.' The district court followed the
Supreme Court of the United States's analysis of school-sponsored
speech in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.6 But more significantly, the district court's straightforward acceptance of homosexuality
remained a pervasive theme in Keeton.' As such, Keeton represents a
growing culmination of homosexual rights, emphasizing the readiness of
modern courts to both reflect and shape public opinion with a positive
acknowledgement of the homosexual community. As momentum builds
toward an evaluation of same-sex marriage by the Supreme Court,' such
vital undercurrents of social construction will decidedly bear on the
constitutional rights of homosexuals in the United States.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the fall of 2009, Jennifer Keeton enrolled at Augusta State
University (ASU) to pursue a master's degree in Counseling Education,
hoping to become a school counselor.9 In the context of various
curricular activities, Jennifer continually voiced her condemnation of the
homosexual "lifestyle" and her support of "conversion therapy" for
GLBTQ clients based on her religious ideals.o Alarmed by Jennifer's
desire to alter her future clients' sexual orientations, faculty members
grew concerned about Jennifer's ability to separate her religious-based
moral judgments from her professional role as a counselor. If Jennifer
continued to refuse to set aside her viewpoint out of respect for a
potential client's sexual identity, she would fail to meet the ASU

4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. Keeton, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1372-73, 1381.
6. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
7. See 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1375-81.
8. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(addressing the constitutionality of a recent amendment to California's constitution denying
marital recognition to same-sex couples); Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, 699 F.
Supp. 2d 374, 376-77 (D. Mass. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (challenging the
constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act that defined "marriage" as "a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife" and "spouse" as "a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or wife").
9. Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1371 (S.D. Ga. 2010).
10. Id. at 1371-72.
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curricular requirements, which are based on American Counseling
Association (ACA) standards.11
To address Jennifer's potential problems, the faculty created a
Remediation Plan in accordance with program policy.12 Remediation
Plans are commonly used by faculty to assist students struggling with
multicultural clients and to maintain university accreditation by
complying with ACA ethical standards.13 Under Jennifer's Remediation
Plan, she was required to complete several assignments aimed at
increasing her cross-cultural communication skills with members of the
GLBTQ community, ranging from self-reflective writing to attendance
at the Gay Pride Parade in Augusta, Georgia. The faculty assured
Jennifer that she would not be required to change her religious beliefs
to successfully complete the counseling program.' Jennifer expressed
growing concern, however, that she would be required "to affirm the pro[GL]BTQ orthodoxy" in derogation of her First Amendment"e freedom of speech."
Hoping to avoid expulsion from ASU for failure to complete the
curricular requirements under the Remediation Plan, Jennifer filed a
verified complaint and sought a preliminary injunction based on alleged
violations of her civil rights. Jennifer's limited brief for injunctive relief
included the following First Amendment-based claims: viewpoint
discrimination, compelled speech, restriction of free belief on personal
Relying on Hazelwood School District v.
choice, and retaliation.'
Kuhlmeierl9 and a recent, nearly identical case from the United States

11. Id.
12. Id. at 1372. All students could be subject to a Remediation Plan outlined in ASU's
counseling program handbook:
The student will receive a Remediation Plan from her or his advisor (which has
been developed after a personal conference with the advisor and another faculty
member(s)) outlining the faculty's concerns and stating that the student has been
placed on remediation status. In addition, the Remediation Plan will delineate
what conditions the student must meet to be removed from remediation status.
The student will also be informed of the consequences of the failure to comply with
the outlined conditions, including the possibility that the student will be dropped
from the Program.
Id. at 1372 n.4.
13. Id. at 1371 n.1, 1375.
14. Id. at 1372-74.
15. Id. at 1379 (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
17. Keeton, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1379.
18. Id. at 1374.
19. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,o the Southern
District of Georgia denied the preliminary injunction. 2 1 The district
court threw out the case in light of ASU's right to impose reasonable
academic standards in its curricular program despite Jennifer's religious
apprehension. 22
III.

A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Broken Moral Compass: Early Discrimination

Although the court in Keeton 23 focused on the constitutional parameters of school-sponsored speech rather than delving into moral and
political acceptance of homosexuality, this issue was at the heart of
Jennifer's suit. Keeton is a fresh voice in a long conversation about
the traditional role of the teacher and counselor as the representative of
social values. Courts have consistently given legal consideration to the
social role of educators, asserting that "school authorities have the right
and the duty to screen the officials, teachers, and employees as to their
fitness to maintain the integrity of the school[ as a part of ordered
society."a Given the vital role of maintaining the structure of "ordered
society" through America's youth,' teachers and courts must answer
the question: what is an ordered society? As the juxtaposition of Keeton
and earlier cases suggest, society now includes acknowledgment of the
historically marginalized homosexual community."
Conversations about homosexuality were historically restricted in the
classroom," largely due to the traditional majoritarian view that
homosexuality was wholly immoral.2 This social construction abrogated any discussion about sexual orientation with students, forcing
teachers and school officials to conceal their own self-identification as

20. Ward v. Wilbanks, No. 09-CV-11237, 2010 WL 3026428 (E.D. Mich. July 26, 2010).
21. Keeton, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1376, 1381.
22. Id. at 1379-81.
23. 733 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (S.D. Ga. 2010).
24. See id. at 1375.
25. Alder v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952).
26. See id.
27. See, e.g., Keeton, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1379-80; Ward v. Wilbanks, No. 09-CV-11237,
2010 WL 3026428, at *18 (E.D. Mich. July 26, 2010).
28. See, e.g., Jason R. Fulmer, Dismissingthe "Immoral"Teacher for Conduct Outside
the Workplace-Do Current Laws Protect the Interests of Both School Authorities and
Teachers?, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 271, 274-75 (2002).
29. See, e.g., John D'Emilio, Making and Unmaking Minorities:The Tensions Between
Gay Politics and History, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 915 (1986).
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homosexual.30 This social standard was enshrined with a broader scope
in Bowers v. Hardwick,31 a case originating in Georgia, in which the
Supreme Court held the fundamental right of privacy was restricted to
traditionally held institutions including marriage, family, and procreative activity, exclusive of homosexual sodomy.32 Although the Court
in Bowers did not address other aspects of homosexual individuals' lives
beyond the act of sodomy, 33 various courts had already established
precedent attacking other aspects of homosexual self-identification and
These negative perceptions of homosexuality were
parenting.'
analogously and strictly brought to bear on school officials and educators
in their unique roles as the "exemplar[s]" of American values.
Social objectives traditionally have required school officials to serve as
models of American values while simultaneously fixing those virtues in
the nation's youth. 36 Teachers have accordingly been held to a higher
standard of conduct with accompanying scrutiny: "His habits, his speech,
his good name, his cleanliness, the wisdom and propriety of his official
utterances, his associations,... and the character for which he stands
are [all] matters of major concern in a teacher's selection and retention." Close examination of teachers has consequently extended well
beyond the classroom walls into their private lives and public statements.38 This scrutiny, coupled with a pervasive belief in homosexual
immorality, resulted in various legislative attempts to remove any
deviant influence of homosexual teachers39 and also led to teacher

30. See Fulmer, supra note 28, at 274-75.
31. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
32. Id. at 190-91.
33. See High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1370-71
(N.D. Cal. 1987).
34. See, e.g., Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 559 P.2d 1340, 1347 (Wash. 1977)
(affirming the dismissal of a teacher for "immorality" as a publicly acknowledged
homosexual); In re Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 860 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (denying a mother's
custody in the interest ofher child when the mother's homosexuality created an "improper
environment").
35. Fulmer, supra note 28, at 276 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Weiland, 179 Cal. App. 2d 808, 809-10, 813 (1960)
(affirming the dismissal of a teacher who signed student names on attendance records
when the students were absent).
37. Id. at 812 (quoting Goldsmith v. Bd. of Educ., 66 Cal. App. 157, 168 (1924)).
38. See Tingley v. Vaughn, 17 M. App. 347, 351 (1885) ("If suspicion of vice or
immorality be once entertained against a teacher, his influence for good is gone. The
parents become distrustful, the pupils contemptuous and the school discipline essential to
success is at an end.").
39. For an overview of various homosexual civil rights ordinances that ultimately failed
to receive legislative approval in Florida, California, and other states, see Anthony E.
Varona, Setting the Record Straight:The Effects ofthe Employment Non-DiscriminationAct
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Shockingly, judicial
dismissals for known homosexual conduct.'
asserted their
merely
who
individuals
to
extended
sometimes
sanctions
students and
with
orientation
sexual
discussed
homosexual identity or
faculty members."
At the height of anti-gay sentiment in the 1970s,2 the Washington
Supreme Court presented a shattering judgment in Gaylord v. Tacoma
School District No. 10," affirming the dismissal of a public school
James
teacher solely on the basis of his homosexual identity."
Gaylord, "a competent and intelligent teacher," was first brought to the
attention of the school district following a conference with a student who
sought help with "his homosexual problems."s Suspecting Gaylord was
gay, the student reported this assumption to the school principal who
later confronted Gaylord to confirm his homosexuality." Gaylord was
summarily discharged for violating the school district's policy prohibiting
"immorality."
The court analyzed several religious and medical definitions of
homosexuality and immorality before broadly asserting that "[hlomosexuality is widely condemned as immoral and was so condemned as
immoral during biblical times.'" Content with this determination, the
court considered the school's reasonableness in dismissing Gaylord based

of 1997 on the First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights of Gay and Lesbian Public
Schoolteachers, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 25, 30-31 (1998).
40. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Calderon, 35 Cal. App. 3d 490, 492, 497 (1973) (affirming
dismissal of teacher who was acquitted of a criminal charge for oral copulation with
another man who was later, in a civil case, found to have committed the act); Sarac v.
State Bd. of Educ., 249 Cal. App. 2d 58, 60, 63-64 (1967) (affirming revocation of school
teacher's teaching credentials when teacher was convicted of disorderly conduct for having
touched the private sexual parts of another man at a public beach).
41. See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. ofEduc., 136 F.3d 364,366-67,371 (4th Cir.
1998) (affirming teacher's disciplinary transfer after choosing a play containing
controversial themes, including lesbianism, to be performed by her advanced acting class;
Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 450 (6th Cir. 1984) ("[W~e have held
it was not impermissible to discipline the plaintiff for making statements about her sexual
preference."); Collins v. Faith Sch. Dist. #46-2, 574 N.W.2d 889,891,895 (S.D. 1998) (reinstating teacher's position after lower court affirmed dismissal because teacher replied to
students' questions about homosexuality).
42. See Bob Moser, Holy War: the Religious CrusadeAgainst Gays Has Been Building
for 30 Years, INTELLIGENCE REP., Spring 2005, availableat http//www.splcenter.org/intel
/intelreportlarticle.jsp?aid=522 (examining pivotal moments in the gay rights movement).
43. 559 P.2d 1340 (Wash. 1977).
44. Id. at 1342, 1347.
45. Id. at 1345-46.
46. Id. at 1342.
47. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
48.

Id. at 1345.
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on Gaylord's fitness to teach in the wake of such a revelation."
Without identifying evidence that substantially disturbed Gaylord's
capability as a teacher,o the court affirmed the trial court's finding
that Gaylord's sexual orientation would have resulted "in confusion,
suspicion, fear, expressed parental concern and pressure upon the
administration from students, parents and fellow teachers, all of which
would impair appellant's efficiency as a teacher and injure the
school."' Thus, the court's decision took an uncompromising stance:
educators charged with "impress[ing] on the minds of their pupils the
principles of morality" could not affirm homosexuality, either explicitly
or by example." In contrast to this assertion, the dissent observed that
general fear of homosexuality, without evidence of any physical act or
intent, deprived Gaylord of his rights as an American citizen and as a
human being."
B. A New Path: ChangingPerceptions of Homosexuality in the
Professional Counseling Community
Scientists and medical professionals once affirmed negative social
perceptions of homosexual individuals by deeming homosexuality an
aberrant sexual choice or mental disorder." Although a number of
religious and social organizations still consider same-sex attraction a
curable pathological behavior," a multitude of scientific discoveries has
suggested that homosexuality is a benign defining characteristic of
human identity if not an immutable trait.5 6 In 1998 and 1999 the
governing body of the American Counseling Association (ACA) issued
two resolutions opposing the portrayal of homosexual individuals as

49. Id. at 1347.
50. See id. at 1346 (emphasis added) ("[Only] one student expressly objected to Gaylord
teaching at the high school because of his homosexuality.").
51. Id.
52. See id. at 1342, 1347 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 1348
(Dolliver, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 1348-49 (Dolliver, J., dissenting) ("An homosexual is after all a human being,
and a citizen of the United States despite the fact that he finds his sex gratification in
what most consider to be an unconventional manner.").
54. A. Dean Byrd, Homosexuality: Innate and Immutable? What Science Can and
Cannot Say, 4 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 479, 479-80 (2010).
55. Joy S. Whitman et al., Ethical IssuesRelated to Conversion or Reparative Therapy,
AM. COUNSELING Ass'N (May 22,2006), http/www.counseling.org (follow "Search Our Site"
hyperlink; then search "Joy Whitman").
56. Renee Culverhouse & Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect Class, 34 S.
TEx. L. REV. 205, 241-42 (1993).
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mentally ill." The ACA reproached professional counselors conducting
reparative or conversion therapy in an attempt to "cure" homosexuals of
a natural behavior.ss Emphasizing the counselor's calling to "recognize
historical and social prejudices," the ACA encouraged counselors to
understand homosexual construction within a broad cultural context
rather than to promote changes in sexual orientation." The ACA noted
the lack of medical or scientific evidence supporting conversion therapy,
finding that clients are more often harmed than helped by this type of
treatment. 60 As such, the ACA cautioned counselors that referrals to
professionals practicing conversion therapy essentially violates the
counselor's primary responsibility to avoid harming clients. 6 Finally,
the ACA conclusively separated conversion therapy from professional
counseling by deeming conversion therapy a religious-based practice and
refusing to endorse professional counselors trained in this method.62
C. CurricularControl of Student Speech: Laying the Groundwork for
Changing Values
Although students do not "shed their constitutional rights ... at the

schoolhouse gate," school officials may place reasonable restrictions
on student expression to preserve the special purposes and characteristics of the educational system." These special purposes include the
school's aforementioned responsibility to provide academic knowledge
and instill community values."
Accordingly, school officials and
teachers retain the right to impose reasonable restrictions on speech
produced by students in the context of school-sponsored activities.66
For example, the Supreme Court has explicitly authorized teachers to
curtail student expression bearing the school's imprimatur67 as a
57. Whitman, supra note 55.
58. Id.
59. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ACA CODE OF ETHICS E.5.c (2005),
available at http//www.counseling.org/Resources/CodeOfEthicsIP/Home/CT2.aspx.
60. Whitman, supra note 55.
61. Id.; see also ACA CODE OF ETHICS A.1.a (2005), availableat http*J/www.counseling
.org/Resources/CodeOfEthics/TP/Home/CT2.aspx.
62. Whitman, supra note 55.
63. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
64. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at
506) (stating that the rights of students "must be 'applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment'").
65. See Weiland, 179 Cal. App. 2d at 812.
66. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-73.
67. An imprimatur is a "general grant of approval." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 825 (9th
ed. 2009).
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curricular activity." Furthermore, other federal courts have extended
this power beyond the scope of the traditional classroom setting.69

In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeiero the Supreme Court held
that a high school principal was justified in removing two studentproduced articles containing sensitive information from a schoolThe
sponsored newspaper to advance curriculum-based interests.
articles were created for academic credit under the supervision of a
journalism teacher who retained final authority over most aspects of the
newspaper's publication.72 The newspaper bore the school's name and
was created with school resources." Consequently, the Court held that
the casual viewer could reasonably associate the speech directly with the
school, making the content of the newspaper subject to legitimate
pedagogical restrictions." In this case, the principal removed two
articles describing students' experiences with pregnancy and divorce."
According to the school board's policy, the students failed to meet course
requirements dealing with the treatment of controversial issues and
privacy based on "the legal, moral, and ethical restrictions imposed upon
journalists."" The Court affirmed the principal's decision, holding that
students' deviation from the professional standards of journalism
incorporated in the academic curriculum provided a sufficient basis for
legitimate pedagogical concerns."
Although school officials are empowered to restrict "speech that is
inconsistent with [the school's] basic educational mission,"" the Court
has not clarified whether school officials may restrict student speech
based on content alone in addition to limiting the manner in which the
speech is expressed.7 9 Accordingly, the United States Courts of Appeals

68. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-73.
69. See, e.g., Bannon v. Sch. Dist., 387 F.3d 1208, 1214 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that
a mural on a school wall is school-sponsored speech under Hazelwood); McCann v. Fort
Zumwalt Sch. Dist., 50 F. Supp. 2d 918, 923 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (holding that a drug-related
song performed by a school marching band is school-sponsored speech under Hazelwood).
70. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
71. Id. at 275-76.
72. Id. at 268.
73. Id. at 262-63.
74. See id. at 271-72.
75. Id. at 263.
76. Id. at 268 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id. at 276.
78. Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
79. See id. at 271-72 (suggesting in dicta that a school may refuse to sponsor certain
student speech but failing to explicitly address the issue of viewpoint neutrality).
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have taken opposing approaches to this question.' Some courts have
adhered to the long line of cases requiring viewpoint neutrality in noneducational social contexts; other courts have granted greater power
and deference to school officials based on their responsibility to instill
community values in young citizens.' The latter approach highlights
the tension placed on educators who are called to instill tolerance of
differing viewpoints while simultaneously preferring certain perspectives
to further educational interests." Although the Southern District of
Georgia adamantly ignored this tension, the conflict between competing
social values actually formed the foundation of the decision in Keeton."
D.

New Expectations Emerging in Ward v. Wilbanks

Only a few years after the ACA's official statements regarding
homosexuality, the Supreme Court dramatically overturned Bowers v.
Hardwick85 in Lawrence v. Texas' and acknowledged the right of free
adults to engage in private, consensual sexual conduct." Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's opposition to this
shift in the Court's analysis with a foreboding message of chaos and the
destruction of American social order in favor of the "homosexual
agenda."'
Although the majority's holding in Lawrence has not
"eliminatled] the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to
homosexual conduct,' tolerance of homosexual individuals is emerging
in various social contexts."0 The courts' own acknowledgment of

80. Compare Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617,632-33 (2d Cir. 2005)
(requiring viewpoint neutrality), with Fleming v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d
918, 928 (10th Cir. 2002) (permitting viewpoint discrimination).
81. See, e.g., Peck, 426 F.3d at 632 n.9, 632-33; Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1325
(11th Cir. 1989) ("Without more explicit direction, we will continue to require school
officials to make decisions relating to speech which are viewpoint neutral.").
82. See, e.g., Fleming, 298 F.3d at 928-29.
83. Compare Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (remarking
that inculcating tolerance of differing viewpoints is an essential task of American public
schools), with Fleming, 298 F.3d at 928 (observing that a school may choose to sponsor
student speech opposing drug use without being obligated to sponsor the opposite message).
84. See 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1371.
85. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
86. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
87. Id. at 578.
88. See id. at 591, 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 602.
90. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 428 (Cal. 2008) (finding that "gay
individuals are fully capable of entering into the kind of loving and enduring committed
relationships that may serve as the foundation of a family and of responsibly caring for and
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homosexual orientation is especially evident in the context of the public
school system.9 1
Ward v. Wilbanks,9 2 which was decided one month before Keeton, is
a factually similar case from the Eastern District of Michigan that
defined acceptable academic performance of students training to be
school counselors." The plaintiff, a young orthodox Christian woman,
claimed that the school's academic curriculum abridged various
constitutional rights by requiring her to complete remedial training after
refusing to counsel a homosexual client.' The plaintiff claimed that
the school was discriminating against her on the basis of her religion,
effectively demanding her to change her beliefs and affirm homosexual
behaviors.9" The district court individually examined the plaintiff's
various sub-arguments under the First Amendment' and Fourteenth
Amendment.9 7 The district court's conclusion, however, produced one
point: a student's freedom of speech and exercise of religion are not
abridged when there is no evidence that the school sought to change the
student's religious beliefs, all other students are held to the same
standard of performance, and the school's curricular program "govern [ed]
its counseling students in exactly the same way they will be governed
when they are practicing counselors."
Because of the curricular
program's practical application and derivation from ACA standards, the
district court deemed the program to be "reasonably related to the
legitimate pedagogical goal of maintaining a rigorous counseling
program" to preempt violations of First Amendment freedoms. 99
Considering the rational adoption of ACA standards by the university
counseling program,"

the district court emphasized the importance

of the counselor's nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
the high school environment: "In a high school setting, a counselor can
expect to be presented with all sorts of issues, including homosexuality....
A counselor who cannot keep their [sic] personal values out of
the interaction [with students] has great potential to harm her

raising children").
91. See, e.g., Ward, 2010 WL 3026428, at *2, *5, *19.
92. No. 09-CV-11237, 2010 WL 3026428 (E.D. Mich. July 26, 2010).
93. See id., at *1.
94. Id. at *1-2, *6.
95. Id. at *3, *17.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Ward, No. 09-CV-11237, 2010 WL 3026428, at *13-25.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Ward, 2010 WL 3026428, at *25-27.
98. Ward, 2010 WL 3026428, at *13, *18.
99. Id. at *26.
100. Id. at *14 (considering plaintiffs free speech claim under the Hazelwood analysis).
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The district court denied the plaintiff's request to refer
client."'
homosexual clients to other counselors without religious reservations
about homosexuality.'02 This decision ultimately restricted studentcounselors' ability to avoid contact with the homosexual value system:
[Pilaintiffs request to refer clients based on their protected status
(sexual orientation) was a clear and major violation of the ACA Code
of Ethics as it also would have been if she had refused to counsel an
assigned African American client on the basis that her values would
not allow her to provide services to people of color.103
Instead of endorsing the plaintiff's desire to refer clients, the district
court noted the importance of counselors reflecting on their own
prejudices and assumptions about the homosexual community.'0 By
summarily dismissing the plaintiff's religious reservations, the district
court echoed the ACA's requirement of separation of a counselor's
internal beliefs from the external, professional role of the counselor who
must help clients "explore and clarify their beliefs and apply their values
to solving their own problems."' 5 Accordingly, the counseling student
is called to evaluate her client's problems from the client's socially
acceptable perspective; the counselor may not impose her own worldview
on the client.'s This construction of academic interests and corresponding student rights was followed in near identical fashion by the
Southern District of Georgia in Keeton.0 7
IV.

CouRT's RATIONALE IN KEETON V. ANDERSON-WILEY

Much like the plaintiff in Ward v. Wilbanks,os Jennifer Keeton's
religious values conflicted with curricular requirements and led to
several First Amendment-based claims.' 9 Both plaintiffs' religious

101. Id. at *16.
102. Id.
103. Id. at *18 (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Randall Kennedy,
Marriageand the Struggle for Gay, Lesbian, and Black Liberation,2005 UTAH L. REV. 781
(discussing the similarities between African American and GLBTQ movements towards
equal rights protection).
104. See Ward, 2010 WL 3026428, at *5.
105. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. See id.
107. See 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1376-77 (acknowledging the factual similarity of the cases
and construction of argument).
108. No. 09-CV-11237, 2010 WL 3026428 (E.D. Mich. July 26, 2010).
109. Compare Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1371 (S.D. Ga. 2010),
with Ward, 2010 WL 3026428, at *1, *6.
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reservations were met with the same judicial rebuttal: student speech
must often yield to a college's educational mission.no Writing on
behalf of the Southern District of Georgia, Judge Randal Hall emphatically refused to address the media and internet-driven furor surrounding
Jennifer's conflict with ASU, stating that "this is not a case pitting
Christianity against homosexuality. This case is only about the
constitutionality of the actions taken by Defendants . . . within the

context of Plaintiff's Counselor Education masters degree program at
Augusta State University (ASU), and no more.""' With this succinct
pronouncement, the district court proceeded to determine whether
Jennifer's circumstances merited a preliminary injunction.112 Accordingly, the district court considered whether Jennifer could show a
"substantial likelihood" of succeeding on her First Amendment claims
against ASU.11
Before exploring Jennifer's individual claims, the district court set
analytical parameters.'
First, the district court acknowledged the
Supreme Court's and Eleventh Circuit's broad deference to educators in
matters of academic policy."
Second, the district court recognized
Ward as a factually similar case applying the Hazelwood School District
v. Kuhlmeier116 school-sponsored speech analysis."
In this context,
the district court noted that the controversial curricular program in
Ward was "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns""e
because the program conformed to ACA standards and applied to all
enrolled students regardless of their specific religious preferences.1 s
After clarifying this analytical approach and providing a cursory nod to
First Amendment application to state actors through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,o the district court addressed
each claim presented by Jennifer.1 21

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Compare Keeton, 733 F. Supp. at 1379, with Ward, 2010 WL 3026428, at *19.
Keeton, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1371.
Id. at 1375-76.
Id. at 1375.
See id. at 1376-78.
Id. at 1376.
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Keeton, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1376-77.
Id. at 1377 (quoting Ward, 2010 WL 3026428, at *16).
Id. at 1377, 1380.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Keeton, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1377-81.
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Viewpoint Discrimination

Addressing Jennifer's first claim, the district court's analysis focused
on whether ASU reasonably restricted Jennifer's speech for legitimate
pedagogical purposes.122 The district court addressed the viewpoint
discrimination claim by focusing on the school's intent, determining that
"the government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific
motivating ideology . . . of the speaker is the rationale for the restric-

tions."23 The district court emphasized the freedom of university
programs to craft student curricular responses by acknowledging that
judicial restriction of academic choices should only occur when faculty
decisions serve as a mere pretext for discrimination."24
The district court found no evidence to support the argument that the
Remediation Plan was created due to faculty disapproval of Jennifer's
religious beliefs in relation to homosexuality.'25 Rather, the district
court distinguished between the intent to change an individual's
internally held beliefs and the intent to change an individual's outward
approach to professional counseling in accordance with ACA ethical
standards.1 26 Th e district court determined the Remediation Plan was
designed to help Jennifer separate her preexisting religious ideology
from her professional role as a counselor.127 This was intended to train
her to avoid imposing her particular viewpoint on future clients. 128
Furthermore, because the faculty's intent in designing the Remediation
Plan was to maintain university accreditation by complying with the
ACA and to produce counselors with the capability of counseling
multicultural members of the populace, the district court found that
ASU's program was reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns and therefore merited protection.12

B.

Compelled Speech

The district court briefly addressed Jennifer's claim that she was
forced to affirm homosexual orthodoxy because the Remediation Plan

122. Id. at 1378-79.
123. Id. at 1378 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 829 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1378-79.
128. Id. at 1378.
129. Id. at 1379.
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Instead,
required her to submit monthly updates on her progress.'
the district court emphasized the Remediation Plan's design to bring
Jennifer's counseling skills in line with the ACA Code of Ethics,''
observing that Jennifer's updates were intended to provide an opportunity for reflection on her own moral understanding and the impact that
her personal beliefs could have on potential clients.1 32 The district
court did not question ACA standards, but supported the required
acknowledgment of homosexual identity as a "reasonably related"
curricular standard for counselors.'
Free Exercise
The district court similarly dismissed Jennifer's Free Exercise Clause
claim and emphatically noted the implicit limits on a citizen's right to
exercise religious beliefs, stating that "every person cannot be shielded
from all the burdens incident to exercising every aspect of the right to
practice religious beliefs."" The district court noted "[the prevailing
constitutional standard" that permits incidental restriction of religious
practice when a law-or in this case, a program-"is neutral and of
general applicability."'3 5 Citing similar reasoning applied in Ward, the
district court determined that Jennifer's Free Exercise right was not
unconstitutionally infringed because all ASU counseling students were
subject to sensitivity training under a Remediation Plan with no
exemptions for particular religious beliefs or other characteristics.136
C.

D. FirstAmendment Retaliation
In addressing Jennifer's final claim, the district court presented a
three element test for retaliation. The plaintiff must first show "that
[her] speech or act was constitutionally protected; second, that the
defendant's retaliatory conduct adversely affected the protected speech;
and third, that there is a causal connection between the retaliatory

130. Id.
131. ACA CODE OF ETHics (2005).
132. Keeton, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1379.
133. Id. at 1379-80 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
134. Id. at 1380 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
135. Id. (quoting First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 610 F.3d 1274,
1285 (11th Cir. 2010), vacated by 616 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
136. Id. at 1380-81.
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actions and the adverse effect on speech.""a' Proceeding without
comparing of Jennifer's particular circumstances to any of the test's
elements, the district court suggested that ASU's counseling program fell
wholly outside the realm of retaliatory action."' Instead, the district
court focused on the "academically legitimate" nature of the Remediation
Plan in conjunction with the ACA Code of Ethics, again emphasizing the
fact that Jennifer was never expressly required to change her personal
religious standards."' The district court looked back to its earlier
viewpoint discrimination analysis and the nonexistence of ulterior
motives on the part of the faculty, ultimately concluding that Jennifer
had simply failed to fulfill academic requirements. 4 0
In light of the district court's assessment of First Amendment
retaliation and Jennifer's other claims, the court held that Jennifer was
unable to show a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits of
her lawsuit and denied her motion for preliminary injunction."
V.

IMPLICATIONS

Social acceptance of homosexuality has dramatically changed over the
past thirty years. Schools are no longer uncompromising environments
where homosexual teachers are forced to hide their identity from the
impressionable and presumptively heterosexual minds of children.'42
Cases like Keeton"" and Ward v. Wilbanks'" suggest that the reverse may be emerging by requiring morally-opposed school officials to
acknowledge the homosexual identities of their students.' 4 5 Although
the court in Keeton and Ward produced holdings in the context of
professional counseling programs,'" these cases illustrate a broader
understanding of the conversations that are now appropriate in school
Because school counselors have traditionally been
environments.
included in the court's understanding of "exemplars" charged with
exemplifying American social values and shaping the minds of the

137. Id. at 1381 (alteration in original) (quoting Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247,
1250 (11th Cir. 2005)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 366,371 (4th Cir.
1998); Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 559 P.2d 1340, 1347 (Wash. 1977).
143. 733 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (S.D. Ga. 2010).
144. No. 09-CV-11237, 2010 WL 3026428 (E.D. Mich. July 26, 2010).
145. See Keeton, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1368.
146. Id. at 1371; Ward, 2010 WL 3026428, at *1.
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nation's youth, 4 7 any nondiscrimination requirements placed on these
figures could become equally applicable to the average teacher who
converses with students on a personal level. The willingness to discuss
these issues with America's youth illustrates the accelerating normalization of homosexuality, superseding the historical belief that candid
conversation would somehow "recruitt" naive students "into" homosexuality.' By requiring faculty and students with diametrically opposing
worldviews to engage on a personal level, courts open the door to candid
conversations about homosexuality in other parts of the community,
beyond the counselor's office. In turn, the understanding produced from
such conversations could produce the grassroots movement necessary to
reach other aspects of the American existence as impressionable
students become voting adults.
Teachers and school officials unwilling to participate in open
discussions ofhomosexuality may find themselves increasingly separated
from an emerging, new majoritarian value system. Jennifer Keeton's
own experience suggests that individuals adamantly opposed to
professional standards of counseling could be forced to seek ideological
refuge with likeminded groups outside the public school system. 4 1
With courts' continued affirmation of ACA standards and other
indications of homosexual normalization, religious groups may likewise
feel compelled to seek alternate means of private education for themselves and their children. As courts continue to acknowledge historically
marginalized populations, this protection may polarize some social
communities, particularly in traditionalist regions of the country. This
separation could tragically undermine the growing social acceptance that
has developed in the South-and Georgia in particular-since the days of

Bowers v. Hardwick."o
The Southern District of Georgia's interpretation of constitutional
issues relating to homosexuality in Keeton could also have implications
for other general areas of law. Although the district court attempted to
diminish the tension between conflicting social values by focusing on
professional requirements, the fact remains that these judicial construc-

147. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 278 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Bd. Of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982)).
148. See Varona, supra note 39, at 32-34 (considering the "Recruitment" and
"Molestation" myths applied to homosexual teachers in public schools).
149. See Susan Mccord, Student Suing Augusta State Works at Christian School,
AUGUSTA CHRON., Sept. 11, 2010, http//chronicle.augusta.com/news/education/2010-0911/student-suing-augusta-state-works-christian-school-while-she-awaits.
150. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Bowers andKeeton represent a major shift injudicial thought
in Georgia. Both are Georgia cases, yet they demonstrate a complete change in opinion
regarding homosexual identity in just twenty-four years.
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This
tions favored equality between religion and homosexuality.'
conflict speaks directly to the continuing dispute between various courts
regarding viewpoint discrimination in the context of the American school
system."5 2 Because of the social dynamics presented in this case and
the public's uproar surrounding its result,' Keeton may prompt the
Supreme Court to directly outline the parameters of content-based
restrictions for schools in a subsequent case. The result of a Supreme
Court ruling on viewpoint discrimination could dramatically affect both
the constitutional rights of students and teachers' ability to instill vital
social values. With its resolute affirmation of educational interests, the
district court's decision in Keeton may ultimately restrict student speech
in favor of other important social values.'5
Additionally, the district court's statements stressing nondiscrimination point to the renewed movement for considering homosexuality as a
In
suspect class, meriting stricter scrutiny from American courts.'
the past, courts have been unwilling to extend this designation based on
the perception of homosexuality as a lifestyle choice or sexual preference
rather than an immutable trait.'56 New scientific evidence, coupled
with the district court's comparison of discrimination against African
Americans to discrimination against homosexuals, could suggest a need
to reevaluate the protection afforded to this traditionally marginalized
group.
Whatever the result of Jennifer Keeton's counseling career, the
underlying principles of her case and others like it will have a lasting
151. See Keeton, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1371, 1381.
152. Compare Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 632-33 (2d Cir.
2005) (requiring viewpoint neutrality), with Fleming v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298
F.3d 918, 928-29 (10th Cir. 2002) (permitting viewpoint discrimination).
153. See Adam Folk, Judge Grants Augusta State Stay in Keeton Case, AUGUSTA
CHRON., Nov. 1,2010, httpJ/chronicle.augusta.com/news/2010-11-Oljudge-grants-augustastate-stay-keeton-case (describing a Ku Klux Klan rally and opposing gay-straight alliance
protest in response to Jennifer Keeton's case).
154. Although the Supreme Court initially provided broad protection for students in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969),
subsequent cases have increasingly limited student-speech in various contexts. See, e.g.,
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,410 (2007) (promotion of illegal substances); Hazelwood,
484 U.S. at 271-73 (school sponsored speech); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 686 (1986) (lewd, obscene speech).
155. Some states have already applied heightened scrutiny to statutes that distinguish
on the basis of sexual orientation. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008),
supersededby constitutionalamendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss
v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 115 (Cal. 2009).
156. Courtney A. Powers, FindingLGBTs a Suspect Class:Assessingthe PoliticalPower
of LGBTs As a Basis for the Court's Application of Heightened Scrutiny, 17 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 385, 385 (2010).
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impact on the construction of homosexual rights in the United States.
Keeton provides insight to a number of changing social structures that
have shaped this country, ranging from the classroom to the United
States Constitution. This new awareness may initially cause conflict as
Keeton and its kin continue to reflect and shape various public, judicial,
and legislative conversations. But despite these contentions, the hope
remains that Jennifer's story will help pave the way for a greater
acceptance of those who have been historically marginalized, bringing
America closer to the dream of indivisibility with liberty and justice for

all.
BIILIE PRITCHARD

